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CHAMBERS OF 
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
/ 
October 19, 1982 
• 
. Re: No. 81-430 Illinois v. Gates 
Dear Chief: 
I have received Byron's letter containing its motion to 
reargue this case, made in response to John's earlier 
communication regarding our denial of a motion by the 
petitioner to enlarge the questions presented for decision. 
While I will probably end up voting to grant re-argument, I 
do have some mixed feelings about the question which I set 
forth in the following paragraphs. 
My Conference notes indicate that there were at least 
five votes to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Illinois without the necessity of adopting a "good faith 
exception" to the exclusionary rule in the case of evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant. If this majority would 
adhere to a position that cases such as Aguilar and Spinelli 
remain unmodified as the law in this area, and that the 
Supreme Court of Illinois simply misapplied them, I would 
certainly agree that the case would not amount to much, and 
that re-argument on the "good faith exception" requirement 
would be far preferable than such a result. 
But I thought there was also sentiment at Conference --
whether or not sentiment harbored by a majority a resort to 
my notes does not indicate one way or the other -- that at 
the very least Draper should be fully reestablished as an 
alternative basis to Aguilar and Spinelli for validating 
warrants. I do not think this result is so insubstantial as 
to be dismissed out of hand in preference for a re-argument 
on the "good faith exception." 
Starting with Nathanson v. United States, 290 u.s. 41 
(1933), a three page decision from the good old days holding 
that a warrant to search a private dwelling may not be 
issued unless the magi s trate "can find probable cause 
' 
- 2 -
therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under 
oath or affirmation," 290 U.S., at 47, the Court has come a 
long way in the direction of requiring greater and greater 
compliance with what are arguably highly technical 
requirements; the cockles of my heart, at any rate, are not 
warmed by seeing lower courts struggling in long opinions 
with the "veracity prong" and the "knowledge prong" of cases 
such as Aguilar and Spinelli. There seems to be another 
trend afoot at the same time, which, while not contradicting 
the above-mentioned cases, proceeds on much more of a 
"totality of the circumstances" approach. Cases such as 
Draper v. United States, 358 u.s. 307 ·(1959), United States 
v. Ventresca, 380 u.s. 102 (1965), and the opinion of the 
majority of Harry's old Court in Spinelli v. United States, 
382 F.2d 871 (1967) are examples of these opinions. 
I think a reconsideration of some of these principles 
governing the contents of an application for a warrant is 
somewhat overdue, and I cannot as presently advised satisfy 
myself that such a result would be a less significant 
contribution to the law in this area than would be a "good 
faith exception" made to the exclusionary rule. In the case 
of a good faith exception, whatever its contours might be, 
the magistrates would presumably still be operating under 
Aguilar and Spinelli even though the police officers would 
be given the benefit of a broader rule in determining 
whether the evidence seized pursuant to such warrants should 
be excluded. Likewise, in cases where a defendant has 
effects seized pursuant to a warrant, is bound over for 
trial, but for some reason or another the case is dismissed, 
the officers could well face a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 which would be governed by precedents such as Aguilar 
and Spinelli. 
I would find it helpful, in deciding whether to set 
Gates for reargument, to be further enlightened on the 
contours that a good faith exception would assume. In the 
light of cases such as Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555 
(1978), and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), dealing 
with qualified immunity under §1983, and United States v. 
Peltier, 422 u.s. 531 (1975), dealing with "reasonableness" 
in the context of retroactivity, it might appear that a good 
faith exception would include some sort of objective 
reasonableness requirement. I would also think, however, 
that the "reasonableness" component of the test could be 
satisfied almost automatically. It seems to me that it 
would defy common sense to expect patrolmen and detectives 
to second-guess the supposedly legal judgment of a "neutral 
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and detached magistrate," Johnson v. United States, 332 u.s. 
10, 14 {1948). If there is to be more to the test than the 
mere obtaining of a warrant from a duly authorized 
magistrate, would it involve somewhat relaxed Aguilar and 
Spinelli standards? And if it would, are we really better 
off with a "good faith exception" than we would be by 
reconsidering Aguilar and Spinelli? 
·.sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
